Abstract: Prior studies on FDI technology spillovers have offered little guidance to TNCs on how to protect and exploit technology across borders. The present paper argues that TNCs can manage technology spillovers through selection of entry modes, selection of technologies, and selection of investment priorities in the affiliates they establish in foreign markets. A number of hypotheses are derived from theoretical analyses and are tested against firm-level data from China. The findings of the paper have significant implications for TNCs that face fierce competition from local firms in emerging markets.
In search for new approaches, scholars recently turned to resource-based theory and focused on the technologies that TNCs use in their foreign affiliates. An important contribution was made by Cannice, Chen and Daniels (2004) . It was argued that technologies can be divided into core technologies and periphery technologies according to how critical they are to the distinctive competencies of TNCs. Technologies can also be divided into dependent technologies and independent technologies according to the extent to which they can operate independently. Technologies can be further divided into tacit technologies and explicit technologies according to whether they can be codified. It was suggested that TNCs should choose to use periphery, dependent and tacit technologies in foreign affiliates in order to protect themselves from unwanted technology appropriation. This line of thinking is also evident in other recent studies, and has indeed offered a new approach to crossborder technology management (see, for instance, Norman, 2002; Cannice, Chen and Daniels, 2003; Jordan and Lowe, 2004) .
As is argued in this paper, however, neither selection of technologies nor selection of entry modes can eliminate technology spillovers that are externalities under control of neither side of the interaction. No matter what types of technologies (core or periphery, dependent or independent, and tacit or explicit) are used in foreign affiliates (wholly owned or jointly owned), the technologies are likely to spill over to local firms through various channels. Unfortunately, the current research in management of technology stops at this point, and does not move further to investigate the specific channels by which foreign technologies spill over to local firms. Clearly, neither internalization theory nor resource-based theory can offer sufficient guidance in this regard.
To move a step further, it is essential to develop a framework about how technologies (no matter whether they are core or periphery, dependent or independent, and tacit or explicit) in foreign affiliates (no matter whether they are joint ventures or wholly owned subsidiaries) spill over to local firms via different channels. Based on prior empirical findings on sources of FDI technology spillovers, this paper proposes a tentative framework. As shown in Figure 1 , foreign technologies may spill over to local firms through the input foreign affiliates use in the production process as well as the output foreign affiliates produce and sell. The input includes both capital input, either tangible or intangible, and labour input, either skilled or unskilled. The output includes new products or traditional products on the one hand, and exported products or domestically sold products on the other. The productivity of local firms may be affected by foreign technology spillovers through these channels, either positively or negatively, depending on the nature and the scale of the spillovers through each of these specific channels.
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
It is crucial to note that these specific spillover channels actually represent investment priorities of TNCs in an overseas market. To manage FDI technology spillovers, therefore, TNCs can choose not only between different entry modes in light of internalization theory and between different technologies in light of resource-based theory, but also between different investment priorities in light of the spillover framework proposed in this paper. That is, they can choose between investment in tangible assets and investment in intangible assets, between investment in projects that require employment of skilled workers and investment in projects that require employment of unskilled workers, between investment in production of exported products and investment in production of domestically sold products, and between investment in development of new products and investment in production of traditional products. A combination between selection of entry modes, selection of technologies, and selection of investment priorities is a more promising approach to cross-border technology management.
The next step that follows from the above discussion is to investigate possible differentials in the spillover effect between specific channels of FDI technology spillovers in specific entry modes in relation to specific types of technologies used in foreign affiliates. As information of the specific types of technologies that TNCs use in their foreign affiliates is not available and related hypotheses are not testable, I focus discussion on possible differentials in the spillover effect between specific channels of FDI technology spillovers in specific entry modes, and propose ten testable hypotheses about the differentials.
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With regards to entry modes, as suggested by internalization theory, there are marked differences in the organizational structure of different types of foreign affiliates, which are likely to lead to differentials in the impact of FDI on the productivity of local firms. Foreign affiliates in the form of joint ventures involve close cooperation between TNCs and local partners. Within this organizational framework, it is very difficult for TNCs to prevent their technology from being learnt by local partners and then being spread to other local firms. FDI is expected, therefore, to generate positive technology spillovers in joint ventures, and the positive spillover effect may be strong enough to offset any negative spillover effects. In wholly owned subsidiaries, by contrast, TNCs can exploit their firm-specific technology internally and can thus effectively prevent their technology from spilling over to local firms. I would expect, therefore, little positive FDI technology spillovers in wholly owned subsidiaries. Without the positive offsetting the negative, negative FDI technology spillovers may prevail. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are derived from these analyses. With regards to spillovers through input, tangible assets of foreign affiliates are difficult to be protected from being observed and copied by local firms and are, therefore, likely to generate positive technology spillovers to local firms. By contrast, intangible assets of foreign affiliates are normally well protected from being 'stolen' by local firms and are, therefore, unlikely to generate positive technology spillovers to local firms. Moreover, foreign affiliates that employ skilled workers with high salaries are likely to draw away skilled employees from local firms, thus negatively affecting the productivity of local firms. Foreign affiliates that employ unskilled workers with low salaries are not, by contrast, in fierce competition with local firms for skilled workers and yet they have to provide training for the unskilled local recruits, so they are likely to generate positive technology spillovers to local firms. Hypotheses 3, 4, 5 and 6 are derived from these analyses.
Hypothesis 3. FDI technology spillovers via tangible assets are likely to be positive and the positive effect is likely to be, according to hypothesis 1, stronger in joint ventures than wholly owned subsidiaries.
Hypothesis 4. FDI technology spillovers via intangible assets are likely to be either insignificant or negative and the negative effect, if there is any, is likely to be, according to hypothesis 2, stronger in wholly owned subsidiaries than joint ventures.
Hypothesis 5. FDI technology spillovers via employment of skilled local workers are likely to be either insignificant or negative and the negative effect, if there is any, is likely to be, according to hypothesis 2, stronger in wholly owned subsidiaries than joint ventures.
Hypothesis 6. FDI technology spillovers via employment of unskilled local workers are likely to be positive and the positive effect is likely to be, according to hypothesis 1, stronger in joint ventures than wholly owned subsidiaries.
With regards to spillovers through products, the products foreign affiliates sell within host countries can be easily observed and imitated by local firms, so they may generate positive technology spillovers to local firms. The products foreign affiliate export to overseas markets are, by contrast, relatively difficult to be observed and imitated by local firms, so they may not generate positive technology spillovers to local firms. Similarly, the design of new products is normally treated as top secret and, therefore, is not easily observed and imitated by local firms, at least in the short run. Over time, however, new products become traditional products, and local firms manage to observe and imitate them. Therefore, traditional products, rather than new products, of foreign affiliates may generate positive technology spillovers to local firms. Hypotheses 7, 8, 9 and 10 are derived from these analyses.
Hypothesis 7. FDI technology spillovers via exported products are likely to be either insignificant or negative and the negative effect, if there is any, is likely to be, according to hypothesis 2, stronger in wholly owned subsidiaries than joint ventures.
Hypothesis 8. FDI technology spillovers via locally sold products are likely to be positive and the positive effect is likely to be, according to hypothesis 1, stronger in joint ventures than wholly owned subsidiaries.
Hypothesis 9. FDI technology spillovers via newly developed products are likely to be either insignificant or negative and the negative effect, if there is any, is likely to be, according to hypothesis 2, stronger in wholly owned subsidiaries than joint ventures.
Hypothesis 10. FDI technology spillovers via traditional products are likely to be positive and the positive effect is likely to be, according to hypothesis 1, stronger in joint ventures than wholly owned subsidiaries.
Finally, it is useful to think about how the FDI technology spillovers analysed above are related to different types of technologies employed by TNCs in foreign affiliates, and to formulate some hypotheses that, though not testable in this research, may stimulate future research. As argued by Cannice, Chen and Daniels (2004) , it is relatively easy for local firms to learn and benefit from core, independent and explicit technologies used by TNCs in their affiliates in host countries. In these affiliates, therefore, FDI is expected to generate positive technology spillovers to local firms, and the effect of positive technology spillovers may be strong enough to offset the effect of negative spillovers.
In contrast, it is relatively difficult for local firms to learn and benefit from periphery, dependent and tacit technologies used by TNCs in their affiliates in host countries. In these affiliates, I would expect little positive FDI technology spillovers. Without the positive offsetting the negative, negative FDI technology spillovers may prevail. Hypotheses 11 and 12 are derived from these analyses.
Hypothesis 11. Positive FDI technology spillovers via the various channels discussed above are more likely to occur in TNCs' affiliates that use core, independent and explicit technologies, especially if these affiliates are, according to hypothesis 1, in the form of joint ventures.
Hypothesis 12. Negative FDI technology spillovers via the various channels discussed above are more likely to occur in TNCs' affiliate that use periphery, dependent and tacit technologies, especially if these affiliates are, according to hypothesis 2, in the form of wholly owned subsidiaries.
In the following section, I proceed to empirically test the hypotheses that are testable with the data available. 
METHOD, VARIABLES AND DATA
In the empirical estimation, I follow Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Tian (2007) to use basic log-linear production functions at the firm level in the form:
where log output Y for firm i in sector j at time t is regressed on a vector of inputs (X) and the presence of FDI in an industrial sector (FDI_share). On the basis of this benchmark model, I proceed to compare the effects of FDI technology spillovers in the three main entry modes prevailing in China -wholly owned subsidiary (WOS), equity joint venture (EJV) and cooperative joint venture (CJV), and divide FDI_share into three separate components representing the presence of the three entry modes in an industrial sector, respectively. 5 I thus rewrite Equation (1) as
I use the value added for output, the capital stock for capital input and the number of employment for labour input, respectively. I deflate the value added at the 1990 constant price and deflate the capital stock by the GDP deflator. In addition to the three major independent variables in the production function, I include four-digit ISIC industry dummies to control for productivity differences across industries, and annual time dummies to control for time-varying components. I also include a variable, productivity gap, to control for the productivity differentials between foreign affiliates and local firms, which is defined as the ratio of the average labour productivity of foreign affiliates in the relevant four-digit ISIC industry to the labour productivity of individual local firms in that industry. The dataset contains detailed information about firm-level inputs and output. As determined by the purpose of the study, I am particularly interested in the information about the variables representing foreign presence in an industrial sector. First, I use the equity joint venture share, the cooperative joint venture share and the wholly owned subsidiary share in total capital of an industrial sector to capture the effect of FDI technology spillovers on local firms through the capital of each of the three entry modes, respectively. I also use the equity joint venture share, the cooperative joint venture share and the wholly owned subsidiary share in tangible assets and intangible assets of an industrial sector to capture the effect of FDI technology spillovers on local firms through the tangible assets and the intangible assets of each of the three entry modes, respectively. Furthermore, I use the foreign affiliate share in total capital, tangible assets and intangible assets of an industrial sector to estimate the effect of FDI technology spillovers on local firms through the total capital, the tangible assets and the intangible assets of all foreign affiliates, respectively. Second, I use the equity joint venture share, the cooperative joint venture share and the wholly owned subsidiary share in total employment of an industrial sector to capture the effect of FDI technology spillovers on local firms through the total workforce employed in each of the three entry modes, respectively. I use the employment shares of equity joint ventures, cooperative joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries with skilled workers in an industrial sector to capture the effect of FDI technology spillovers on local firms through skilled workers employed in each of the three entry modes, respectively.
10 I also use the employment shares of equity joint ventures, cooperative joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries with unskilled workers to capture the effect of FDI technology spillovers on local firms through unskilled workers employed in each of the three entry modes, respectively. Furthermore, I use the foreign affiliate share in total employment of an industrial sector, the employment share of foreign affiliates with skilled workers in an industrial sector and the employment share of foreign affiliates with unskilled workers in an industrial sector to estimate the effect of FDI technology spillovers on local firms through the total workforce, the skilled workers and the unskilled workers employed in all foreign affiliates, respectively.
Finally, I use the equity joint venture share, the cooperative joint venture share and the wholly owned subsidiary share in total sales of an industrial sector to capture the effect of FDI technology spillovers on local firms through the products of each of the three entry modes, respectively. I also use the equity joint venture share, the cooperative joint venture share and the wholly owned subsidiary share in exports, domestic sales, new products and traditional products of an industrial sector to capture the effect of FDI technology spillovers on local firms through the exported products, the locally sold products, the newly developed products and the traditional products of each of the three entry modes, respectively. 11 Furthermore, I use the foreign affiliate share in total sales, exports, domestic sales, new products and traditional products of an industrial sector to estimate the effect of FDI technology spillovers on local firms through the total products, the exported products, the locally sold products, the newly developed products and the traditional products of all foreign affiliates, respectively. The summary statistics of these variables are reported in Table 1 .
(Insert Table 1 about here)
RESULTS
Following Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Tian (2007) , I use the ordinary least square approach in the regression analysis. As the variables representing foreign presence in capital, product and employment of an industrial sector are highly correlated, I do not include them in the same regression to avoid multicollinearity. In what follows, I report the empirical findings from the regression analysis on FDI technology spillovers via capital, employment and product in the three entry modes, respectively. We should bear in mind that the effects of technology spillovers through capital input, labour input, and product are, as indicated in Figure 1 , dependent on the combined effects of technology spillovers through individual components of each of the three aggregate channels. We treat these individual components as disagregate channels of technology spillovers, and examine each of them in the empirical tests.
Spillover Effect via Capital and Labor Inputs
I first estimate the effect of FDI technology spillovers on local firms through capital and labour inputs in the three entry modes, and report the results in Table 2 (Insert Table 2 
Spillover Effect via Products
I then compare the effects of FDI technology spillovers on local firms through products in the three entry modes, and report the results in Table 3 . As shown in column 1, the coefficient on the share of equity joint ventures in the total value of sales of an industrial sector and the coefficient on the share of cooperative joint ventures in the total value of sales of an industrial sector are both positive but statistically insignificant, while the coefficient on the share of wholly owned subsidiaries in the total value of sales of an industrial sector is negative and statistically significant. The result suggests that joint ventures do not have a significantly positive effect of technology spillovers on local firms through product sales, while wholly owned subsidiaries generate a significantly negative effect on the productivity of local firms through product sales. The results further back up hypothesis 2.
(Insert Table 3 
DISCUSSION
As shown in the study, the effect of FDI technology spillovers differs significantly from one channel to another, from one entry mode to another, and from one type of technology to another. FDI technology spillovers are difficult, if not impossible, to be completely brought under control. However, the substantial differentials in the effect of FDI technology spillovers found in this study shed light on how TNCs may manage technology spillovers strategically in emerging markets. In this section, I
discuss main findings of the study and their managerial implications, and point to limitations of the study and areas of future research.
Findings and Their Managerial Implications
Positive FDI technology spillovers are, as suggested by internalization theory and evidenced in this study, more likely to occur in joint ventures than wholly owned subsidiaries. Whenever possible, therefore, TNCs should establish wholly owned subsidiaries to protect technology. In reality, however, TNCs often have compelling reasons to establish joint ventures rather than wholly owned subsidiaries in emerging markets and therefore have to look for alternative approaches to cross-border technology management. Selection of technologies is, as suggested by resource-based theory and evidenced in the study by Cannice, Chen and Daniels (2003, 2004) , an alternative approach. That is, TNCs can choose to use periphery, dependent and tacit technologies in the affiliates they establish in emerging markets to minimize unwanted technology appropriation.
Nevertheless, FDI technology spillovers are externalities that may take place through a variety of channels no matter what types of technologies TNCs choose to use in their foreign affiliates. To address the problem, the study develops a framework to explain how FDI technology spillovers take place through various channels under different entry modes and proposes a number of hypotheses. The study contends that these spillover channels actually represent investment priorities of TNCs in foreign markets, and that selection of investment priorities is therefore as important to TNCs in managing technology spillovers as selection of entry modes and selection of technologies. This is a significant contribution to the literature on FDI technology spillovers. In testing the hypotheses, the study reaches a number of empirical findings that have practical implications for TNCs in managing FDI technology spillovers in emerging markets.
The study finds, for instance, that positive technology spillovers occur through tangible assets rather than intangible assets, which implies that TNCs should make investments in the form of intangible assets rather than tangible assets to protect their technology in the joint ventures they establish in emerging markets. The study also finds that positive technology spillovers occur through employment of unskilled workers rather than employment of skilled workers, which implies that TNCs should focus on investment projects that require employment of skilled local workers rather than investment projects that require hiring and training of unskilled local workers in order to protect their technology in the joint ventures they establish in emerging markets. The study further finds that positive technology spillovers occur through locally sold products rather than exported products and through traditional products rather than newly developed products, which implies that TNCs should focus on investments in development of new products that target overseas markets rather than investments in production of traditional products to be sold in the local market in order to protect their technology in the joint ventures they establish in emerging markets.
In addition, the study finds strong evidence of a negative effect of technology spillovers via the products that TNCs' wholly owned subsidiaries export abroad and via the skilled workers that TNCs' wholly owned subsidiaries employ with attractive salaries. The finding suggests that TNCs can make full use of wholly owned subsidiaries in competition with rival local firms in emerging markets if they prioritize investment projects appropriately, that is, if they focus on export-oriented projects to take advantage of the market stealing effect and/or focus on projects that require employment of skilled local workers to take advantage of the skill stealing effect. The study thus provides guidance to TNCs not only on how to minimise positive technology spillovers to local firms but also on how to take full advantage of negative technology spillovers in competition with rival local firms in emerging markets.
Limitations and Future Research Areas
Despite the path-breaking way of thinking, the interesting empirical findings and the important managerial implications, the study is limited in the scope of analysis and the depth of investigation.
First of all, TNCs often face other pressing strategic issues in emerging markets, and have to compromise their concern over technology spillovers in order to address these issues. They may have to establish, for instance, joint ventures to please the government in emerging markets for possible support in a business project. They may have to focus on production of locally sold products and promotion of traditional products in emerging markets in order to pre-empty the market before their rivals. They may have to invest in projects that hire unskilled local workers in order to establish good relationships with the government in emerging markets that are facing a serious problem of unemployment. They may have to use core, independent and explicit technologies in the affiliates they establish in emerging markets in exchange for market entry permission. In the real business world, therefore, TNCs have to balance these strategic concerns against the concern over technology spillovers. 
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the study takes the initiative to discuss how TNCs may deal with the challenge of managing FDI technology spillovers in emerging markets. In order to exploit as well as protect technology, the study argues, TNCs can choose between different entry modes, between different technologies, and between different investment priorities when they enter emerging markets. TNCs may use any of the three approaches or any combination of them in consideration of the particular circumstances they face. There are, however, some limitations in the study that need to be overcome in future research. Table 2 . Spillover effect via capital and Labor inputs Notes: 1) All specifications include annual time dummies and four-digit ISIC industry dummies. Numbers in parentheses under the coefficient estimates are White heteroscedasticity consistent T ratios; 2) * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.5; and *** p < 0.1.
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Capital inputs Labor inputs ( 6 I also use an autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust estimation based on the Newey-West method to achieve consistent estimates in the presence of generally unspecified autocorrelation, and the results remain virtually unchanged. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for advice on this method. 7 It is argued that the GMM method may be an alternative to the OLS method to deal with the problem.
I also tried the GMM estimations and the results hardly change. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this alternative method.
